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11 Introduction
The link between bank competition and banking system stability has recently received renewed
interest. Two approaches have emerged in this literature.1 The ﬁrst one is the “competition-
fragility” approach according to which a rise in bank competition may destabilize the banking
system. Indeed, due to the resulting decrease in their proﬁtability, banks are encouraged to
take excessive risks to increase returns and recover their margin proﬁts. As noticed by Keeley
(1990) in his pionnered paper, such banks’ behavior may lead to a deterioration in the quality
of the loan portfolio, leading to an increase in the bank fragility. This view has been followed
by many authors such as Demsetz et al. (1996), Hellmann et al. (2000) or Jimenez et al.
(2007).
The second, opposite approach, is the so-called “competition-stability” one according to which
more competition between banks has positive eﬀects on the banking system stability. The
main explanation relies on the borrowers’ behavior: the lower interest rates induced by bank
competition tend to decrease moral hazard. Hence, the default risk is reduced. This view,
supported by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), has been investigated empirically in Boyd et al.
(2006), De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2006) and Schaeck et al. (2006) among others.
From an empirical viewpoint, results are somewhat mitigated regarding the superiority of one
approach to the other. This absence of clear-cut ﬁndings may be due to various factors. The
ﬁrst one may come from the absence of a unique measure of bank competition. This issue has
been investigated by Berger et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2006) among others, showing that
concentration measures are not always suitable for assessing bank competition. Second, the
link between bank competition and banking system stability may be polluted by endogeneity
problems, in the sense that the degree of bank competition may itself depend on the stability
of the banking system (see Berger et al. (2004) for an empirical investigation regarding this
point).
In addition to these factors that have been investigated in the literature, we think that the
measure retained for the stability of the banking system may also play a crucial role. Various
measures have been used in previous works, mainly based on risk exposure indicators such as
proxies for loan portfolio risk, proxies for ﬁrm’s probability of failure, the level of bank’s capital-
ization,2 and—at a more macroeconomic level—the probability of failures in the banking sector
and of generalized banking crises (Beck et al., 2006). In this paper, we propose to contribute
to this literature by relying on credit procyclicality. The general concept of credit procyclical-
ity refers to the relationship between private credit and GDP. Here, relying on a VAR-type
framework, we propose a precise measure of credit procyclicality based on the impulse response
function of credit to a shock in GDP. The underlying idea for considering the credit procycli-
cality as an indicator of the banking sector stability is quite simple. As argued by Goodhart
and Hofmann (2004), the liberalization of the ﬁnancial sector has contributed to increasing the
procyclicality of ﬁnancial systems through the development of procyclical lending practices of
banks. The historical experience tends to attach some weight to this argument by showing that
1See Carletti and Hartmann (2003) and Berger et al. (2009) for a survey.
2See Boyd et al. (2006), Jimenez et al. (2007), and Berger et al. (2009). In particular, as noticed by Berger
et al. (2009), an increase in the loan risk does not necessarily imply a rise in the overall bank risk, putting
forward the importance of the choice of the risk measure in empirical analyses.
2episodes of ﬁnancial turbulences and crises have frequently been preceded by credit booming
(Borio and Lowe, 2004; Detken and Smets, 2004; Adalid and Detken, 2007; Goodhart and
Hofmann, 2008). Within this framework, our aim is to investigate the link between banking
system stability—apprehended through the credit dynamics—and banks’ market power. More
speciﬁcally, we aim at studying whether credit procyclicality—i.e. the response of the credit
market to a shock on GDP—is more important when the degree of banking competition is
higher. This point has a direct implication for the design of banking regulation. Addressing
procyclicality in bank behavior has become a priority for banking regulators since the 2007-
2008 ﬁnancial crisis. In particular, Basel III reform introduces a countercyclical capital buﬀer
and promotes more forward-looking provisioning practices (BIS, 2009a). However, if factors
related to the banking system structure—as the degree of competition—are also relevant to
explain credit procyclicality, banking regulators should not focus only on prudential measures.
The relationship between credit procyclicality and bank competition is investigated on a sam-
ple of 17 OECD countries over the 1986-2009 period. We rely on the panel VAR (PVAR)
modelling, allowing us to work in a multi-country framework, which is obviously relevant
when analyzing the stability of banking system—which may be subject to contagion eﬀects.
We consider two estimation methods for the PVAR model to provide robust results regard-
ing the interactions between credit and business cycles, and then derive the corresponding
impulse-response functions to assess the credit response to a shock on the GDP. Given that
our sample covers various economies, we account for its potential heterogeneity by estimating
the PVAR on sub-groups of countries depending on their degree of bank competition. As pre-
viously mentioned, we pay a particular attention to this measure of bank competition, which
we assess through the use of a hierarchical clustering approach.
Our paper contributes to the recent literature in several ways. First, by relying on credit
procyclicality, we add to the discussion on how to measure the stability of the banking sys-
tem. Second, we speciﬁcally account for heterogeneity among countries through the use of
a hierarchical clustering methodology. This allows us (i) to provide an original measure of
bank competition based on several indicators, and (ii) to classify the countries according to
this degree of bank competition. Third, our paper also adds to the “competition-fragility” ver-
sus “competition-stability” debate concerning the link between bank competition and banking
system stability. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the banking system regulation by
investigating the determinants that are at play in the procyclical character of credit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and their trans-
formations. Section 3 deals with the measure of bank competition through the use of a
hierarchical clustering approach. In Section 4, we present the results of the PVAR estimation
for the diﬀerent clusters, together with the impulse-response functions. Section 5 provides
some concluding remarks.
2 Data
We consider quarterly data over the 1986-2009 period for the following sample of 17 OECD
countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
3United States.3 Note that, following Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2009), our sample
starts in 1986 to avoid outliers observations due to the high-inﬂation period that ends in the
mid 1980s.
Regarding the data, the following variables enter in our PVAR speciﬁcation: credit cycle and
business cycle—which are our main variables of interest—and three control variables, namely
the inﬂation rate, the interest rate, and share prices. So, in addition to the inclusion of the ﬁrst
two control variables that are standard in the monetary policy literature, we also introduce
share prices series in our analysis, because there is an obvious link between asset price dynam-
ics and ﬁnancial (in)stability: as recalled by Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) among others,
booming asset prices episodes are frequently viewed as announcing future sharp correction of
prices, generating instability of the ﬁnancial and banking sector. In addition, regarding the
interplay between ﬁnancial constraints and entrepreneurship, both private credit and stock
market capitalization can be seen as supplementary (or complementary) sources of ﬁnanciali-
sation.
The credit cycle variable is built on bank credit to the private non-ﬁnancial sector taken from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF, except for Canada (source:
Statistics Canada), and Norway for 2007Q1 to 2009Q4 (source: Norges Bank). These credit
series exhibit important level shifts notably due to changes in deﬁnitions. We have adjusted
the series for these level shifts following the methodology proposed by Stock and Watson
(2003): the growth rate of the observation aﬀected by the level shift is replaced by the median
of the growth rate of the two periods before and after the occurence of the level shift (see
also Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008).4 Turning to the GDP series, they are extracted from
the OECD database and are expressed in real terms. We derive credit cycle and business
cycle variables by isolating the cyclical components of credit and GDP series using the usual
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. The credit cycle is therefore represented by the percentage credit
gap, and the business cycle by the percentage output gap.5
Turning now to the control variables, we consider three series. The annual inﬂation rate is
based on the consumer price index, which is extracted from the OECD database for all the
countries of the sample. The interest rate is the money market rate taken from the OECD
database, except for Japan (source: IFS), and Denmark and Finland for which some observa-
tions were missing for the year 1986 and have been complemented using IFS. Finally, share
price series are taken from the OECD database (“all share” prices). Like for credit and GDP
series, to isolate the cyclical component of interest rates and share prices, these two series
3This sample of countries—ensuring data availability—is also retained by Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach
(2008, 2009) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008).
4Following Goodhart and Hofmann (2008), we have corrected for the following level shifts: Australia in
1989Q1 and 2002Q1; Belgium in 1992Q4 and 1999Q1; Canada in 2001Q4; Denmark in 1987Q4, 1991Q1, and
2000Q3; Finland in 1999Q1; France in 1999Q1; Germany in 1990Q2 and 1999Q1; Italy in 1999Q1; Ireland in
1995Q1 and 1999Q1; Japan in 1997Q4 and 2001Q4; Netherlands in 1988Q4; Spain in 1986Q1 and 1999Q1;
Sweden in 1996Q1; Switzerland in 1996Q4; UK in 1986Q2; and USA in 2001Q4.
5Note that, following Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008, 2009) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008)
among others, credit is not expressed in real terms. However, to assess the robustness of our results, we have
also considered speciﬁcations in which credit has been deﬂated using either the CPI or the GDP deﬂator. The
conclusions remain globally similar to those presented in this paper, and detailed results are available upon
request to the authors.
4are considered in their HP ﬁltered versions.6 More precisely, our interest rate variable is the
cyclical component deduced from the HP ﬁlter, and our share prices variable is the percentage
gap obtained from a one-sided HP ﬁlter.7 GDP, credit and share price series have been taken
in logarithms, and all series—except interest rates and share prices—have been seasonally
adjusted.
Finally, it should be noticed that all the ﬁltered series are, by deﬁnition, stationary. We thus
have to check the stationarity property only for the inﬂation rate variable. To this end, we
have applied various panel unit root tests. All the tests point to the rejection of the null
hypothesis of unit root, indicating that inﬂation rate is also a stationary series.8
3 Assessing the degree of bank competition
3.1 Preliminary analysis
Supply factors explaining procyclicality in credit might be noticeably diﬀerent accross coun-
tries. These factors are related to the modiﬁcation in bank behavior during the business cycle.
Banks can have incentives to relax credit standards during economic upswings, which leads
to a rapid growth in bank lending and then to excessive risk taking.9 Several theories of bank
behavior, such as disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 1986) or herd behavior (Rajan,
1994), support this point and the “competition-fragility” approach suggests that these pro-
cyclical behaviors should be more important when bank competition is higher.
Within this context, an important question concerns the measure of bank competition and its
eﬀect on credit procyclicality. Diﬀerent measures have been proposed in the literature (see
Section 3.2), among which the most common ones are: (i) a concentration index given by the
total market share of the three largest banks, (ii) the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI), and
(iii) the ﬁnancial freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. As an illustration and to give
a ﬁrst insight regarding the importance of the choice of the bank competition proxy, Figure
1 shows the average of these three measures between 2004-2008 (2004-2007 in the case of
6The case of the interest rate deserves some comments. Indeed, various methods exist to estimate the
“equilibrium” value of the interest rate (see Giammarioli and Valla (2004) for a survey). One may rely on
univariate methods, such as (i) the calculation of averages (or moving averages) of observed interest rates,
and (ii), as in the current paper, the use of ﬁlters—the underlying idea being that the equilibrium is proxied
reasonably well by the trend. Another common method is to derive the equilibrium interest rate from the
estimation of a Taylor-type monetary-policy rule, or from its time-varying extension based on the Kalman
ﬁlter. Structural models, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models may also be used, as well as the yield
curve and asset pricing models to derive equilibrium interest rates. While these three last methods are clearly
beyond the scope of our paper, the use of a Taylor-type rule may be viewed as a good candidate to estimate
the equilibrium interest rate. However, we choose here the ﬁltering methods which are the simplest ones,
and which have the advantage of being not dependent on the choice of various parameters that enter in the
monetary-policy rule such as the retained measure for the output gap, the choice of the inﬂation target, the
choice of instruments if one relies on the Kalman methodology...
7The share prices trend is therefore estimated recursively, i.e. without future data.
8The Levin and Lin (1992, 1993), Maddala and Wu (1999), Breitung (2000), and Im, Pesaran and Shin
(2003) tests all reject the null hypothesis at the 1% signiﬁcance level. The detailed results are available upon
request to the authors.
9See for example Keeton (1999) and Jiménez and Saurina (2006) about the relationship between rapid
credit growth during the economic upswing and loan losses during the downturn.
5the HHI) versus the average correlation between credit cycle and business cycle.10 The main
conclusion that emerges from this ﬁgure is that the classiﬁcation of countries depends on the
retained measure for bank competition. As an example, the correlation between credit and
business cycles is high for Switzerland. This country is characterized by high concentration and
HH indices—illustrating a weak degree of bank competition—and by a relatively important
ﬁnancial freedom index—suggesting some degree of bank competition. In other words, a
country may appear more or less competitive in the banking sector, depending on the proxy
used for bank competition. This illustrates the diﬃculty to draw general conclusions regarding
the links between bank competition and credit procyclicality on the basis of only one measure
of bank competition. As a consequence, it is crucial to rely on a more general approach,
accounting for various measures of bank competition simultaneoulsy, in order to properly
investigate the interactions between credit procyclicality and market power. This is the aim
of the hierarchical clustering approach.
3.2 Hierarchical clustering
Our previous preliminary analysis outlines two important aspects. First, diﬀerent measures of
bank competition yield opposite predictions regarding the relationship between competition
and credit procyclicality. In this sense, the alternative measures should be seen as comple-
mentary rather than substitutes. Second, there is important heterogeneity among countries,
which cannot be captured by a single model for the whole panel. Therefore, to account for this
potential heterogeneity and in order to assess whether the procyclicality of credit is diﬀerent
across countries with diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial competition, we proceed by performing a hi-
erarchical clustering. To this end, we consider many indicators and divide our original sample
into three sub-samples according to the degree of bank competition in the considered countries.
We retain 10 variables to make the hierarchical clustering:
• C3: a concentration index given by the assets of three largest banks as a share of assets
of all commercial banks,
• HHI: the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index, deﬁned as the sum of squared market shares,
• FREE: the ﬁnancial freedom index from the Heritage Foundation,
• REST: a measure of a bank’s restrictions to engage in securities and insurance activities,
• DEPTH: the credit depth of information index from the Doing Business project,
• BC: total assets of commercial banks as a share of total assets of the banking system,11
• GV T: the fraction of the banking system loans in banks that are 50% or more govern-
ment owned,
10These correlations are deduced from the estimation of bivariate VAR processes between credit and business
cycles. More speciﬁcally, to explore the co-movements between the two variables, we used the approach based
on the conditional correlation coeﬃcients of VAR forecast errors (den Haan, 2000). Complete results are
available upon request to the authors.
11The banking system is represented by “other monetary institutions”, i.e. commercial banks + savings
banks + cooperative banks + other miscellaneous monetary institutions.
6Figure 1: Mean correlation between credit and business cycle versus the HH, ﬁ-





















































7• FOR: the fraction of the banking system loans in banks that are 50% or more foreign
owned,
• MARGIN: bank’s net interest income as a share of their interest-bearing assets,
• CRED: private credit to GDP ratio.
C3, FREE, DEPTH, BC, MARGIN and CRED are taken as averages over the 2004-2008
period. C3, MARGIN and CRED come from the World Bank database on ﬁnancial devel-
opment and structure, BC is computed from the OECD database, FREE is taken from the
Heritage Foundation database, and DEPTH from the World Bank Doing Business database.
HHI corresponds to an average over the 2004-2007 period and has been provided by Goddard
et al. (2010). REST, GV T and FOR are extracted from the World Bank database on bank
regulation and supervision which contains data for the yearend 2005.
The concentration index (C3) and the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) are widely used
to measure bank competition and are based on the traditional approach that associate more
ﬁrms with more competition. However, barriers to entry and more generally market contesta-
bility, which can represent an important aspect of competition, are not captured by these two
indices. The ﬁnancial freedom index (FREE), the measure of a bank restrictions (REST)
and the credit depth of information index (DEPTH) allow to include, to a certain extent,
this dimension in the hierarchical clustering.12 The bank ownership structure could be also
informative to characterize competition. We capture this aspect with the variables BC, GV T
and FOR which measure respectively the importance of commercial banks, government owned
banks and foreign owned banks. Finally, we include the net interest margin (MARGIN) as a
partial measure of banks market power, and the credit-to-GDP ratio (CRED) to control for
the size of the credit market in the economy.
The hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) is performed on the principal components of
a factorial analysis. We retain 5 factors which represent 85% of the variance in the dataset. We
use the Euclidean distance as metric for calculating dissimilarities between countries and the
Ward’s method to build the hierarchy.13 The clusters produced by the HAC are illustrated
by the dendrogram displayed in Figure 4 in Appendix. We retain three clusters which are
composed as follows:
• cluster 1: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, UK and the USA,
• cluster 2: Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland,
• cluster 3: Germany, Italy and Japan.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics to highlight the main characteristics of each cluster. Mean
tests are performed to evaluate if diﬀerences are signiﬁcant. Cluster 1, composed mainly of
12The World Bank database on bank regulation and supervision contains data on the number of applications
for commercial banking licenses received and denied from domestic and foreign entities over the period 2000-
2005. However, this information is not useful for our sample of 17 counties. The ratio of denied entry
applications to received entry applications is 0, except for Italy.
13The Ward’s method minimizes the increase in variance for the cluster being merged.
8English-speaking countries, is notably characterized by a high ﬁnancial freedom index, a bank-
ing system principally owned by commercial banks and a high credit-to-GDP ratio. Compared
to the whole sample, cluster 1 is also characterized by a lower concentration index, a higher
credit depth of information index and lower bank’s restrictions (REST), despite the non sig-
niﬁcance of the mean test at the 10% level for this last variable. Cluster 2 is composed of
continental European countries and its characteristics are close to the ones obtained for the
total sample, except for the concentration index which is higher, and the credit depth of in-
formation index which is lower. Finally, cluster 3 merges countries with a speciﬁc banking
system structure. The low concentration and Herﬁndahl-Hirschman indices and the limited
importance of commercial banks can be explained by the large number of cooperative banks
in Germany, Italy and Japan.14 Compared to the global sample, this cluster is also character-
ized by lower ﬁnancial freedom index and credit to GDP ratio, and by few foreign owned banks.
On the whole, cluster 1 merges countries with the higher degree of competition in their banking
system, while cluster 3 merges countries with the lower degree of competition. The degree of
competition that we capture appears mainly through the freedom in ﬁnancial activities and
the importance of commercial banks in the banking system. Finally, it has to be noticed
that according to the number of variables used to perform the HAC, some countries can move
from one cluster to another. For example, if we consider a narrow set of variables composed
only of the concentration, the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman and the ﬁnancial freedom indexes, France
joins cluster 3 and Denmark cluster 1. However, this kind of modiﬁcation in the clustering
methodology does not modify the core of cluster 1 composed of English-speaking countries
and the core of cluster 3 made of Germany, Italy and Japan.
4 The PVAR analysis
According to the “competition-fragility” view—apprehended through the credit dynamics—we
expect the two following propositions to be observed:
• Proposition 1: procyclicality in credit is higher in cluster 1. Banking systems in this
cluster are more owned by commercial banks and beneﬁt from more freedom. Banks
could therefore be more encouraged to take excessive risks during an economic upswing.
• Proposition 2: procyclicality in credit is lower in cluster 3. With a lower importance
of commercial banks and with lower freedom, we could expect that banks have less
incentives and/or less possibilities to take excessive risks during an economic upswing.
To investigate the relevance of these two propositions, we proceed to the PVAR estimation at
the cluster level.
4.1 Methodology
In order to assess the link between credit procyclicality and bank competition in our three
sub-samples of countries, we consider the following PVAR model for each of the three clusters:
14Cooperative banks operating at the regional level can impact the concentration and the Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman indexes. This speciﬁc banking structure can therefore reduce the accuracy of these indexes to
measure the degree of competition when international comparisons are done.
9Yi,t = αi + A(L)Yi,t + εi,t (1)
where i denotes the country, t = 1,...,T, Yi,t is the vector of endogenous variables, εi,t is the
vector of errors, αi denotes the country-speciﬁc intercepts matrix, and A(L) represents the
matrix polynomial in the lag operator L—the number of lags being selected using the Akaike
information criterion. The vector Yi,t is given by:
Yi,t = (FCREDi,t,FGDPi,t,Fii,t,FSHAi,t,πi,t)
0 (2)
where FCREDi,t is the credit cycle (i.e. the ﬁltered series for the credit), FGDPi,t the busi-
ness cycle (i.e. the real GDP ﬁltered series), Fii,t the interest rate ﬁltered series, FSHAR
the share prices ﬁltered series, and πi,t denotes the inﬂation rate.
The interest of the PVAR approach is that it combines the traditional VAR framework—
in which all the variables are endogenous—with the panel-data setup—in which unobserved
individual heterogeneity is allowed. Turning to estimation issues, it is well known that the
standard ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator is biased in dynamic panel speciﬁcations, due to the existence
of correlation between the regressors and the ﬁxed eﬀects. To overcome this issue, we consider
here two alternative estimation methods: the mean group (MG) and generalized method of
moments (GMM) methodologies.
The MG methodology (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995) consists in estimating separate rela-
tionships for each country (or group) and then averaging the estimated parameters and their
standard errors. Thus, denoting by ˆ ai the estimated coeﬃcients of interest, the mean group

















As suggested by Kireyev (2000), since the MG estimator is a simple arithmetic average of time
series estimates, the PVAR is given by the average of the function rather than the function of
the average. This approach allows performing a VAR on a panel without losing consistency.
Alternatively, we use the GMM methodology. Since the ﬁxed eﬀects in Equation (1) are
correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variables, the mean-diﬀerencing
procedure commonly used to eliminate ﬁxed eﬀects would create biased coeﬃcients. To avoid
this problem, we use forward mean-diﬀerencing, also referred to as the “Helmert procedure”
(see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Love and Zicchino, 2006). In this procedure, to remove the
ﬁxed eﬀects, all variables in the model are transformed into deviations from forward means,
then each observation is weighted to standardize the variance. This transformation preserves
the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors, so we can use lagged
10regressors as instruments and estimate the coeﬃcients by the GMM procedure. A special fea-
ture of the GMM estimation is that the number of moment conditions increases with T. Yet,
there is convincing evidence that too many moment conditions introduce bias while increasing
eﬃciency. To deal with this issue, it is suggested to use a subset of these moment conditions to
take advantage of the trade-oﬀ between the reduction in bias and the loss in eﬃciency. There-
fore, we restrict the moment conditions to a maximum of two lags on the dependent variable.15
Once the coeﬃcients have been estimated using the MG and GMM procedures, we compute
the impulse response functions (IRFs), together with their conﬁdence intervals.16
4.2 Results
As mentioned before, in order to investigate the procyclical character of credit, we analyze the
response of the credit variable to a shock on GDP for our three groups of countries. To this
end, we rely on the Cholesky decomposition to identify the shocks. We consider the following
ordering:17 πi,t,FGDPi,t,FCREDi,t,Fii,t,FSHARi,t. The ordering of the ﬁrst two variables
is standard in the monetary transmission literature (Christiano et al., 1999). We order share
prices last in the system, given the fact that they are dependent on the discounted value of
future earnings, i.e. on the interest rate. The ordering of credit—placed before the interest
rate—may be seen as somewhat arbitrary. This choice—also made by Assenmacher-Wesche
et al. (2008)—is based on the assumption that movements in the stock of credit may immedi-
ately inﬂuence interest rates, while credit is assumed to respond only gradually to interest rates
movements.18 Based on these hypotheses, Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions
at the cluster level, together with their 5% error bands, obtained respectively with the MG
and GMM estimators.19 Despite some diﬀerences in terms of signiﬁcance, the two methodolo-
gies give similar results concerning the values and the scale of the impulse response functions.20
Three main comments can be drawn from these ﬁgures. Firstly, Proposition 2 is conﬁrmed. In
cluster 3, the GDP shock does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on credit with the MG estimator.
After two quarters, the impulse response of credit is signiﬁcant during six periods with the
GMM estimator, but the value of the response is quite low. The initial shock to GDP is 0.15,
15Note, however, that the results presented are robust to the number of instrumental variables used.
16Note that, in the case of the GMM estimation, we rely on boostrap methods to derive the IRFs’ conﬁdence
intervals.
17Recall that the usual convention is to adopt a particular ordering and allocate any correlation between the
residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes ﬁrst in the ordering. The identifying assumption is
that the variables that come earlier in the ordering aﬀect the following variables contemporaneously, as well
as with a lag, while the variables that come later aﬀect the previous variables only with a lag.
18This hypothesis seems quite reasonable but, for robustness checks, we have also estimated the generalized
impulse response functions (GIRF). The latter, introduced by Pesaran and Shin (1998) have the advantage to
allow for the construction of an orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering. The
results were very similar to those obtained using the Cholesky decomposition, and are thus not reported here
to save space (they are available upon request to the authors).
19The corresponding response functions of GDP to a shock in GDP are given in Figure 3 in Appendix.
20Indeed, the main diﬀerence between the two methodologies is that conﬁdence intervals are systemically
higher with the MG estimator, a fact that may be explained by the tendency for GMM estimates to display
less important standard errors. In addition, in the case of the MG estimator, standard errors are calculated
from X samples of T observations, while only one sample of X×T observations is used in the case of the GMM
estimator, where X denotes the number of countries in each cluster. As a consequence, the GMM estimator
tends to be more precise than the MG one, explaining the lower corresponding standard errors.
11while the impulse response of credit reaches its maximum at 0.05 during period 5. As a result,
the procyclicality in credit is not or weakly observed in cluster 3 characterized by the lower
level of bank competition.
Secondly, Proposition 1 is not conﬁrmed. Indeed, the impulse response of credit does not seem
diﬀerent between cluster 1 and cluster 2. In the two sub-samples, the initial shock to GDP is
around 0.15 and the impulse response of credit reaches its maximum during period 5 at 0.15
with the GMM estimator and 0.13 with the MG estimator. As a result, the higher degree
of bank competition in “English-speaking” countries (cluster 1) does not lead to a stronger
procyclicality in credit. To illustrate and conﬁrm this ﬁnding, Figure 5 in Appendix reports
the diﬀerence IRF between the two samples according to the MG estimation. The diﬀerence
between the two impulse responses is not signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Thirdly, it is worth mentioning that the lower procyclicality observed in cluster 3 as compared
to clusters 1 and 2 could lead to the wrong conclusion that the degree of competition explains
the procyclicality in credit. However, recall that this group is formed only of three countries,
namely Japan, Germany and Italy. Among them, only the ﬁrst two present non-signiﬁcant
impulse response functions, illustrating the special situation of the Japanese and German
banking systems. Turning to Italy, the response is rather close to the rest of the countries
in the panel: positive and signiﬁcant, with its two times standard error band intersecting the
horizontal axis after 6 periods.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The recent worldwide turmoil has highlighted signiﬁcant weaknesses in the banking regulatory
and supervisory system, opening a debate about the role that bank competition and access
to ﬁnance play in causing and propagating the crisis. Our aim in this paper is to contribute
to this debate by investigating to what extent competition in the banking sector can be ben-
eﬁcial to the banking system stability. While the previous literature mainly focuses on risk
exposure indicators or on probability of bank failures, we add a new dimension to the analysis
by measuring the banking system stability through the credit procyclicality.
Within this context, we aim at studying whether the credit procyclicality is more important
when the degree of bank competition is high. This relationship between credit procyclicality
and bank competition is investigated on a sample of 17 OECD countries over the 1986-2009
period. From a methodological viewpoint, we account for heterogeneity among economies
through the use of a hierarchical clustering methodology, and estimate panel VAR models
on the resulting sub-groups of countries. Our ﬁndings show that while credit signiﬁcantly
responds to shocks to GDP, the degree of bank competition is not essential in assessing the
procyclicality of credit for our group of OECD countries.
Regarding the two main conﬂicting approaches, namely the “competition-fragility” and “competition-
stability” views, our results do not support any of them. Indeed, a banking system with more
freedom and mainly owned by commercial banks does not lead to stronger swings in credit
during a business cycle, and the degree of competition appears rather not essential to as-
sess the procyclicality in credit. Our ﬁndings rather suggest that in an attempt to reduce
procyclicality in bank lending behavior, the focus should be placed on the micro and macro-
prudential regulation. Modiﬁcations in capital requirements, in bank provisioning practices or
the introduction of a systemic risk regulation to dampen credit procyclicality21 do not need
complementary measures on the banking system structure to supervise the degree of bank
competition.
References
Adalid, R. and Detken, C. (2007), “Money’s Role in Asset Price Booms”, ECB Working Paper
No. 732.
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995), “Another Look at the Instrumental Variables Estimation
of Error-components Models”, Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-51.
Assenmacher-Wesche, K. and Gerlach, S. (2008), “Monetary policy, asset prices and macroe-
conomic conditions: a panel-VAR study”, Working Paper Research 149, National Bank of
Belgium.
Assenmacher-Wesche, K. and Gerlach, S. (2009), “Financial Structure and the Impact of
Monetary Policy on Asset Prices”, Working Paper 2008-16, Swiss National Bank.
21See for example the Geneva Report (2009), the Turner Review (2009), the Financial Stability Forum
Report (2009), BIS (2009, 2010), Saurina (2009) or Repullo et al. (2009) about the diﬀerent proposals to
introduce countercyclicality into prudential regulation.
15Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (2006), “Bank concentration, competition, and
crises: ﬁrst results”, Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 1581-1603.
Berger, A.N., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Levine, R. and Haubrich, J. (2004), “Bank concentration
and competition: An evolution in the making”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36,
433-451.
Berger, A.N., Klapper, L.F. and Turk-Ariss, R. (2009), “Bank competition and ﬁnancial sta-
bility”, Journal of Financial Services Research 35(2), 99-118.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2009a), “Strengthening the resilience of the banking
sector”, Consultative Document, Basel, December.
BIS (2009b), “Risk and opportunities: towards a fail-safe ﬁnancial system”, 79th Annual
Report, Basel, June.
BIS (2010), “Macroprudential policy and addressing procyclicality”, 80th Annual Report,
Basel, June.
Borio, C. and Lowe, P. (2004), “Securing Sustainable Price Stability: Should Credit Come
Back from the Wilderness?”, BIS Working Paper No. 157.
Boyd, J. and De Nicolo, G. (2005), “The Theory of Bank Risk Taking Revisited”, Journal of
Finance 60, 1329-1343.
Boyd, J., De Nicolo, G. and Jalal, A.M. (2006), “Bank risk taking and competition revisited:
New Theory and Evidence”, IMF Working paper, WP/06/297.
Breitung, J. (2000), “The local power of some unit root tests for panel data”, in B. Baltagi
(ed.), Advances in Econometrics, Vol. 15: Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and
Dynamic Panels, Amsterdam: JAI Press, 161-178.
Carletti, E. and Hartmann, P. (2003), “Competition and Financial Stability: What’s Special
about Banking?”, In Monetary History, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets: Essays in
Honour of Charles Goodhart, Vol. 2, edited by P. Mizen, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Christiano, L.J., Eichenbaum, M. and Evans, C.L. (1999), “Monetary Policy Shocks: What
Have We Learned and To What End?”, in: John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford (ed.),
Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 65-148.
De Nicolo, G. and Loukoianova, E. (2006), “Bank Ownership, Market Structure, and Risk”,
Unpublished Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
den Haan, W.J. (2000), “The comovement between output and prices”, Journal of Monetary
Economics 46, 3-30.
Demsetz, R., Saidenberg, M.R. and Strahan, P.E. (1996), “Banks with something to lose:
The disciplinary role of franchise value”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy
Review 2(2), 1-14.
Detken, C. and Smets, F. (2004), “Asset Price Booms and Monetary Policy”, ECB Working
Paper No. 364.
Financial Stability Forum Report (2009), “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Ad-
dressing Procyclicality in the Financial System”, Basel, April 2009.
16Geneva Report (2009), “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation”, Geneva Report
11, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Giammarioli, N. and Valla, N. (2004), “The natural real interest rate and monetary policy: a
review”, Journal of Policy Modeling 26, 641-660.
Goddard, J., Liu, H., Molyneux, P. and Wilson, J. (2010), “The Persistence of Bank Proﬁt”,
Bangor Business School Working Paper 10/002.
Goodhart, C. and Hofmann, B. (2004), “Deﬂation, Credit and Asset Prices”, in R. Burdekin
and P. Siklos (eds), Deﬂation. Current and Historical Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 166-88.
Goodhart, C. and Hofmann, B. (2008), “House Prices, Money, Credit, and the Macroeconomy”,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24, 180-205.
Guttentag, J. M. and Herring, R.J. (1986), “Disaster Myopia in International Banking”, Essays
in International Finance, 164, International Finance Section, Princeton University.
Hellmann, T.F., Murdock, K. and Stiglitz, J. (2000), “Liberalization, moral hazard in banking
and prudential regulation: are capital requirements enough?”, American Economic Review 90,
147-165.
Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H. and Shin, Y. (2003), “Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels”,
Journal of Econometrics 115, 53-74.
Jimenez, G., Lopez, J. and Saurina, J. (2007), “How does competition impact bank risk
taking?”, Working Paper, Banco de Espana.
Jimenez, G. and Saurina, J. (2006), “Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation”,
International Journal of Central Banking 2(2), 65-98.
Keeley, M. (1990), “Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 1183-1200.
Keeton, W. (1999), “Does faster loan growth lead to higher loan losses ?”, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Second Quarter, 57-75.
Kireyev, A. (2000), “Comparative Macroeconomic Dynamics in the Arab World: A Panel VAR
Approach”, IMF Working Paper 54.
Levin, A. and Lin, C.F. (1992), “Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and ﬁnite sample
properties”, Discussion Paper 56, Department of Economics, University of California at San
Diego.
Levin, A. and Lin, C.F. (1993), “Unit root tests in panel data: new results”, Discussion Paper
92-93, Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego.
Love, I. and Zicchino, L. (2006), “Financial development and dynamic investment behavior:
Evidence from a panel VAR”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 46, 190-210.
Maddala, G. and Wu, S. (1999), “A comparative study of unit root tests and a new simple
test”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 631-652.
Pesaran, M.H. and Shin, Y. (1998), “Generalized impulse response analysis in linear multi-
variate models”, Economics Letters 58(1), 17-29.
17Pesaran, M. H. and Smith, R. (1995), “Estimating Long-Run Relationships from Dynamic
Heterogeneous Panels”, Journal of Econometrics 68, 79-113.
Rajan, R. G. (1994), “Why credit policies ﬂuctuate: A theory and some evidence”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109, 399-442.
Repullo, R., Saurina, J. and Trucharte, C. (2009), “Mitigating the Procyclicality of Basel II”,
in Macroeconomic Stability and Financial regulation: Key Issues for the G20, edited by M.
Dewatripont, X. Freixas and R. Portes, RBWC/CEPR.
Saurina, J. (2009), “Loan loss provisions in Spain. A working macroprudential tool”, Bank of
Spain, Revista de Estabilidad Financiera, 17, 11-26.
Schaeck, K., Cihak, M. and Wolfe, S. (2006), “Are More Competitive Banking Systems More
Stable?”, Unpublished Working Paper No. 143, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
D.C.
Stock, J., and Watson, M. (2003), “Forecasting Output and Inﬂation: The Role of Asset
Prices”, Journal of Economic Literature 41, 788-829.
The Turner Review (2009), “A regulatory response to the global banking crisis”, March.
Appendix




19Figure 4: Dendogram (hierarchical agglomerative clustering)
20Figure 5: Diﬀerence impulse response function cluster 1 and cluster 2
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